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Of Property and Federalism 
abstract.   This Essay proposes a mechanism for expanding competition in state property 
law, while sketching out the limitations necessary to protect third parties. The fact that property 
law is produced by the states creates a unique opportunity for experimentation with such 
property and property-related topics as same-sex marriages, community property, adverse 
possession, and easements. The Essay begins by demonstrating the salutary effects of federalism 
on the evolution of property law. Specifically, it shows that competition among states has created 
a dynamic property system in which new property institutions replace obsolete ones. The Essay 
then contemplates the possibility of increasing innovation and individual choice in property law 
by inducing state competition over property regimes. Drawing on the scholarly literature 
examining state competition for corporate law and competition over the provision of local public 
goods, the Essay constructs an open property system that creates an adequate incentive for the 
states to offer new property regimes and allows individuals to adopt them without relocating to 
the offering state. This Essay also has important implications for the burgeoning literature on 
the numerus clausus principle, under which the list of legally permissible property regimes is 
closed. The Essay argues that in a federal system, it is socially desirable to expand the list of 
property forms to include certain out-of-state forms. 
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University of Pennsylvania Law School; Visiting Professor, Bar-Ilan University, Faculty of Law. 
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introduction 
Property law in the United States is largely the domain of the states, not the 
federal government.1 This seemingly unremarkable fact has profound 
implications for the structure and substance of property law and policy. The 
existence of multiple jurisdictions creates a potential for competition over 
property forms. Competition over property forms, in turn, leads to innovation 
in property doctrine. Examples are legion. In the area of marital property, for 
example, New York recognizes professional degrees as marital property,2 
California and eight other states subject assets accumulated during marriage to 
a community-property regime,3 and Massachusetts has recently announced 
that same-sex marriages must be recognized under its state constitution, 
effectively granting married same-sex couples the same property rights as all 
other married couples.4 Examples can be found outside of the realm of marital 
property as well. Artists in California enjoy droit de suite—a continuing 
property right over fine art whose title they have surrendered to others.5 And 
many states have recognized the validity of conservation easements for 
                                                                                                                      
1.  See, e.g., Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 22 (1990) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (recognizing “state law as the traditional source of . . . real property interests”). 
Federal property law is traditionally limited to the regulation of properties owned by the 
United States and intellectual property law—subjects specifically placed under congressional 
jurisdiction by the U.S. Constitution. The Property Clause of the Constitution grants the 
national government authority to regulate properties it owns. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 
(“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . .”). The 
Constitution also empowers the national government to exercise authority over federal 
enclaves within states. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (granting Congress the power to “exercise 
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over . . . the Seat of the Government . . . and to 
exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the 
State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, 
and other needful Buildings”). Additionally, the Patents and Copyrights Clause gives 
Congress the power to establish and regulate intellectual property rights. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 
(granting Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries”). While both the Takings Clause and the Federal Due Process 
Clause limit national powers to regulate property, they have the effect of making many 
kinds of property issues an amalgam of state and federal law. Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 942-99 (2000); see also Stewart E. 
Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203 (2004). 
2.  O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985). 
3.  See WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED 
STATES, at xxvii (6th ed. 2004); Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 124 n.229 (2004). 
4.  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
5.  CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 986 (West 1982 & Supp. 2005). 
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environmental protection, in spite of the common law rule that no 
nontraditional types of easements may be recognized.6 American property law 
may, therefore, be viewed as a giant laboratory in which states vie to develop 
the most efficient property regime.7 Although the effects of state competition 
have been closely scrutinized by scholars in other legal fields—most notably 
corporate law8—the impact on property law has been largely neglected.9 
The importance of federalism in property law is highlighted by the recent 
scholarly movement to embrace the numerus clausus principle as a defining 
feature of the field.10 The numerus clausus principle, as familiarly enunciated by 
Bernard Rudden, holds that the law of property “lays down a restricted list of 
entitlements which it will permit to count as property interests, or ‘real rights’. 
Anything else sounds only, if at all, in contract.”11 Thus, for example, Anglo-
American law recognizes only four types of present possessory estates in land: 
fee simple, fee tail, life estate, and leasehold.12 Any attempt to create a new type 
of estate will be rejected by the courts.13 Yet, as we will argue, the numerus 
                                                                                                                      
6.  See Todd D. Mayo, A Holistic Examination of the Law of Conservation Easements, in 
PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 26, 27-31 
(Julie Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000) (explaining the variety of 
conservation statutes among the states, some based directly on the Uniform Conservation 
Easement Act, others bearing little resemblance to that Act). 
7.  Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
8.  See infra Section II.A. 
9.  Stewart Sterk has done a great deal of work addressing the role of state competition and 
federalism in the development of several discrete areas of property law. See, e.g., Stewart E. 
Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 
(2000) [hereinafter Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts]; Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among 
Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions, 45 VAND. L. REV. 831 (1992); Sterk, supra 
note 1; Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition To Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities: 
R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097 (2003). 
10.  See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The 
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002); Daphna 
Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1669, 1730-39 (2003). 
11.  Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem, in 
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 239, 239 (John Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 3d ser. 1987). 
12.  These estates may be found in their absolute forms, or as defeasible estates, such as life 
estate determinable or fee simple subject to condition subsequent. See Thomas W. Merrill & 
Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus 
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 12-13 (2000). 
13.  See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
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clausus description of property law as limited to this short menu is only partly 
accurate, because menus differ from state to state.  
Interstate competition in property law may be characterized by two poles. 
In most cases, the menu of available property forms is determined by the situs 
of the property. Consequently, if an individual wants to benefit from a 
property form not offered on the local menu of forms, she must incur the cost 
of relocating to another state. If the relevant asset is realty, changing situs may 
be impossible altogether. At this extreme, then, the numerus clausus description 
of property law is quite accurate. 
At the other extreme, however, property owners can reach beyond the 
limits of the local menu and take advantage of the national menu. Under the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, an act establishing 
property status must generally be respected in all states. Thus, when one state 
adopts a lax form of divorce or recognizes same-sex marriage, states must 
generally recognize this status as one giving rise to the ordinary property forms 
attending marriage or its dissolution.14 As Nevada’s divorce law has 
demonstrated,15 it is relatively cheap for parties to take advantage of out-of-
state status opportunities and thereby import out-of-state law to expand the 
list of available property forms beyond those offered on the local menu. At this 
extreme, then, the numerus clausus description of property law is incomplete.16 
Federalism allows owners to reach beyond a short menu of forms, making 
the number of property forms variable over time and between states. The 
importance of federalism in fostering dynamism and choice can be seen 
throughout the law of property. Consider again laws related to spousal and 
joint property rights. Some states provide for the creation of “community 
                                                                                                                      
14.  See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942) (requiring North Carolina to 
recognize a divorce issued by a Nevada court). But see Defense of Marriage Act § 2, 28 
U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) (“No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian 
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any 
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the 
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.”). As we discuss 
below, there are important limitations on the requirement that states grant full faith and 
credit to one another’s acts. See infra notes 180-189 and accompanying text. 
15.  See infra note 76 (discussing some consequences of Nevada’s liberal divorce law). 
16.  States may take action to prevent nonresidents from enjoying the benefits of local law or 
residents from taking advantage of foreign law. Massachusetts, for example, bars out-of-
state couples from getting married if the marriage would be illegal in their state of residence. 
This law would prevent nonresident same-sex couples from marrying in Massachusetts. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 11 (West 1998). Likewise, Massachusetts law invalidates 
marriages contracted by Massachusetts residents in out-of-state jurisdictions if the marriage 
would have been illegal under Massachusetts law. Id. § 10. 
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property” between spouses;17 others restrict spousal rights to individually 
owned property or the traditional cotenancies (joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, and tenancy by the entirety).18 Some states have abolished tenancies 
by the entirety (a form of joint tenancy available only to married couples);19 
others have simply altered the rules governing such tenancies.20 Some states 
allow unilateral conversion of a joint tenancy into a tenancy in common;21 
others do not.22 Some states allow spousal rights to be claimed by same-sex 
couples;23 others do not.24 These conflicting state rules do not stay meekly in 
place. According to statistics compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau, 43.4 million 
Americans changed their place of residence between March 1999 and March 
2000, 19.4 million of whom moved to new states.25 As couples move across 
                                                                                                                      
17.  See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 382 (5th ed. 2002) (noting that 
community-property systems exist in Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, 
New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin); see also ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., 
THE LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 5.14-.16, at 232-44 (2d ed. 1993) (describing the history and 
nature of community property systems). 
18.  See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 383-419 (discussing the common law marital 
property system). 
19.  See 7 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 52.01[3], at 52-4 to -12 (Michael 
Allan Wolf ed., 2001) (discussing each state’s approach to tenancy by the entirety); Colleen 
M. Feeney, Note, Lien on Me: After Craft, a Federal Tax Lien Can Attach to Tenancy-by-the-
Entirety Property, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 245, 255 n.78 (2002) (listing and discussing states in 
which, as of 2002, tenancy by the entirety has either been abolished or never existed: 
California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin). 
20.  See 7 POWELL, supra note 19. 
21.  See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 17, § 5.4, at 199-200 (noting the general rule that a joint 
tenant can unilaterally sever a joint tenancy by transferring his interest to a third party, 
thereby converting the joint tenancy to a tenancy in common). 
22.  See, e.g., Spitz v. Rapport, 604 N.E.2d 801 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a joint tenant 
may not unilaterally terminate the survivorship rights of another joint tenant). 
23.  For example, Vermont recognizes the rights of same-sex couples to enter into a “civil 
union.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (2002) (providing that parties to a civil union “shall 
have all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive 
from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil 
law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage”); cf. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the Massachusetts Constitution requires legal 
recognition of same-sex marriages). 
24.  See Jes Kraus, Note, Monkey See, Monkey Do: On Baker, Goodridge, and the Need for 
Consistency in Same-Sex Alternatives to Marriage, 26 VT. L. REV. 959, 977 (2002) (“[M]ost 
states and countries still do not offer any benefits to same-sex couples . . . .”). 
25.  See JASON SCHACHTER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P20-538, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: 
GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY 1 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-
538.pdf. 
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state lines, states must adopt rules for dealing with the newly introduced 
property forms.26 Some states look to the situs of the property,27 others look to 
the place of the property right’s creation,28 and yet others create hybrid rules to 
compromise between the conflicting property regimes, essentially creating new 
forms of property.29 
However, competition under the existing federal system is limited. When 
creating new property rights, owners may not choose willy-nilly from the 
competing property regimes now in force throughout the United States. 
Because real property is both immobile and subject to situs rules, it is excluded 
from at least some of the salutary effects of federalism. Even when personalty is 
at issue and, therefore, the owner can avoid situs rules, choice-of-law rules will 
often require that the asset be physically present to some degree in the relevant 
jurisdiction for the asset to be governed by the jurisdiction’s rule. 
This artificial geographic limitation on an owner’s choice creates an 
unnecessary obstacle to interstate competition in property forms and the 
innovation that can result. To see why, consider the effects of federalism on 
contract law. Individuals may adopt any arrangement they want simply by 
inserting a choice-of-law clause in the contract. No similar option is available 
in property law. One may not, for example, create a chattel in California, but 
specify that it will be governed by the property law of Wyoming. To enjoy the 
full benefits of federalism, the owner must make sure that the chattel satisfies 
the relevant situs rules by relocating the chattel to Wyoming at creation. 
This Essay proposes a way to change the existing state of affairs. It outlines 
a new legal mechanism that would increase states’ incentives to create new 
property forms while allowing owners to take advantage of those forms 
without relocating. We posit that under certain plausible conditions our 
mechanism will lead to a “race to the top” in property law. Our starting 
assumption is that the interstate competition made possible by the federal 
structure is highly desirable. First and foremost, competition expands the 
menu of available property regimes, providing citizens with greater choice. A 
                                                                                                                      
26.  For instance, when a married couple owns a car as community property, and then moves to 
a state that does not recognize that property form, the target state must have a rule for 
coping with the unrecognized form. See infra Subsection I.A.3. 
27.  See, e.g., Robby Alden, Note, Modernizing the Situs Rule for Real Property Conflicts, 65 TEX. L. 
REV. 585, 585 (1987) (“Courts continue to reach choice-of-law decisions for real property 
disputes by mechanically applying the situs rule, giving little consideration to concepts of 
fairness and justice.”). 
28.  See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 425 (explaining that in the case of migrating 
couples, “[o]nce the property has been initially characterized, the ownership does not 
change when the parties change their domicile unless both parties consent to the change in 
ownership” (emphasis omitted)). 
29.  See infra note 167. 
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richer menu of property rules gives individuals a greater chance of finding the 
most suitable property regime for them. Second, competition creates a fertile 
ground for experimentation with new property forms and proliferation of these 
forms as states adopt laws that have proven useful in other states. Third, more 
localized control of property forms, particularly those regarding realty, 
produces property law at a level of government to which property owners are 
more likely to pay close attention, resulting in better matches between the rules 
adopted and the affected citizens’ welfare preferences.30 
However, in enlarging the menu of property forms to enhance the 
beneficial effects of federalism, we must take account of the complications 
arising from three interlocking elements. First, in order for state legislatures to 
capture the full value of innovative property forms, they should be able to 
collect payment from out-of-state property owners who wish to adopt them. 
Because innovative forms have some characteristics of public goods, other 
states may be able to free-ride on these innovations. If state legislatures are 
unable to collect such payments, they may have an insufficient incentive to 
come up with new property forms, and competition will be diminished. 
Second, a completely open federal market for property forms would suffer 
from a peculiar imbalance: It would entitle one to establish property forms in 
the entire United States by winning the political debate in a single jurisdiction. 
By contrast, to block a property form, one would have to win the debate in all 
jurisdictions. Third, and finally, legislation results not simply from the well-
intentioned decisions of local policymakers or from local budgetary concerns. 
The political landscape is also influenced by campaign contributions and other 
factors related to the personal interests of the policymakers. Our proposal takes 
account of all three complications.31 
Our Essay relies on two important reference points. The first is the Tiebout 
hypothesis, which predicts that competition among localities will result in a 
variety of communities with different amenities, and citizens will select the 
community that fits their preference best by voting with their feet.32 The 
second is the burgeoning literature on whether state competition in corporate 
law leads to a race to the bottom or a race to the top.33 However, in the 
                                                                                                                      
30.  As William Fischel has noted, the regulation of property taxes at the local level renders 
homeowners particularly attuned to local politics. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER 
HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL 
FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 4-5 (2001). 
31.  See infra Part III. 
32.  In addition, we note Albert Hirschman’s terminology distinguishing between control 
through exit and voice. In the context of this Essay, we treat Hirschman’s work as an 
important extension of Tiebout’s theory. See infra Section II.D. 
33.  See infra Section II.A. 
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property context, there is no one dominant state à la Delaware34 and the 
potential for interstate competition is much greater. Each of these literatures 
provides a rich background for analyzing the importance of interjurisdictional 
competition in producing efficient law. 
By casting a fresh eye on federalism’s effect on property, our Essay 
produces two central insights. The first is theoretical: We show that the 
current restrictive interpretation of property law is choice-constraining and, 
thus, welfare-diminishing. The second is normative: We make a case for 
greater autonomy for owners in selecting the property regime that will apply to 
their assets. Specifically, we propose adopting a flexible version of the numerus 
clausus principle, one that allows owners to go beyond the menu of property 
forms offered in their jurisdiction and to import forms from other states that 
better fit their needs. To avoid a race to the bottom, we suggest that owners 
must register their use of an out-of-state property form. 
The Essay proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we discuss the movement to 
characterize property as embodying a principle of “optimal standardization,” 
and demonstrate why this movement is inherently in tension with the federal 
structure of American property law. In Part II, we connect this observation 
with the ever-burgeoning literature on the importance of state competition in 
the development of efficient legal constructs. In particular, we translate some of 
the findings in the scholarship on corporate law and the Tiebout hypothesis 
into the property context. In Part III, we make the normative case for 
enhancing interstate competition and owner autonomy in property law and 
introduce an innovative proposal capable of achieving these goals. 
i. standardization and change in the law of property 
An accepted part of the property canon in common and civil law systems, 
the numerus clausus principle received scant attention in the United States for 
most of the nation’s history. In fact, until recently no one even bothered to give 
the principle an English name.35 The fortunes of numerus clausus were reversed 
only in 2000, when Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith argued that numerus 
clausus was a central organizing principle of the law of property.36 Expounding 
                                                                                                                      
34.  The official website of the State of Delaware states that “[m]ore than half a million business 
entities have their legal home in Delaware including more than 50% of all U.S. publicly-
traded companies and 58% of the Fortune 500.” State of Delaware, Division of 
Corporations, http://www.state.de.us/corp (last visited Sept. 20, 2005). 
35.  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 4 (“In the common law, the principle that property 
rights must conform to certain standardized forms has no name. In the civil law, which 
recognizes the doctrine explicitly, it is called the numerus clausus—the number is closed.”). 
36.  Id. 
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on Rudden’s description of numerus clausus as forcing a “restricted list of 
entitlements which . . . count as property interests,”37 Merrill and Smith 
developed a theory that positioned the principle at the center of property 
theory. As its name—closed enumeration—suggests, the numerus clausus 
principle closes the list of property forms such that any attempt by private 
parties to create a new form of property succeeds only in creating contractual 
rights enforceable between those parties. The numerus clausus principle 
therefore establishes a sharp line between contract and property law. Parties to 
a contract can create any contractual rights they want, so long as basic 
ingredients such as promise, acceptance, and consideration are present. By 
contrast, parties cannot create a new type of property right, but rather must fit 
a property conveyance into a type already recognized by law.38 Accordingly, a 
lease “for the duration of the war” does not create a leasehold of such duration; 
the leasehold will instead be interpreted as being either a term of years39 or a 
tenancy at will.40 
Merrill and Smith argued that the principle of numerus clausus is central to 
American property law. Noting that property rights are in rem and avail 
against the rest of the world rather than merely those who are parties to an 
agreement, Merrill and Smith tied the numerus clausus principle to a broader 
information-based analysis of property law. They argued that because each 
additional property form increases the burden on third parties of obtaining 
information about the nature of property rights, limiting the list of property 
forms keeps the information costs of property law in check. Thus, where 
Rudden saw no connection between the numerus clausus principle and any 
economic theory, Merrill and Smith seemingly reconciled the two within the 
information-oriented framework. In the aftermath of the Merrill and Smith 
article, there has been an outpouring of articles celebrating the numerus clausus 
principle, on both efficiency and non-efficiency grounds.41 
                                                                                                                      
37.  Rudden, supra note 11. 
38.  Merrill and Smith acknowledged that in some cases parties could utilize existing property 
forms in creative ways in order to achieve functionally new forms. For example, the 
intended lease “for the duration of the war” could be restructured as a conveyance of a 
determinable estate. Merrill and Smith assert that the costliness of this legal creativity can be 
viewed as a “pollution tax” that deters the creation of functionally new forms. See Merrill & 
Smith, supra note 12, at 35. 
39.  See, e.g., Smith’s Transfer & Storage Co. v. Hawkins, 50 A.2d 267, 268 (D.C. 1946) (holding 
that a lease running until the end of World War II was to be treated as a term-of-years 
tenancy). 
40.  See, e.g., Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Kalis, 191 F.2d 739, 740-41 (8th Cir. 1951) (holding that a 
lease until sixty days after the end of World War II was to be treated as a tenancy at will); 
Stanmeyer v. Davis, 53 N.E.2d 22, 24-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1944) (ruling that a lease “for the 
duration of the war” was a tenancy at will). 
41.  See supra note 10. 
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As we show in this Part, the emerging conventional wisdom about the 
desirability of the numerus clausus principle suffers from at least one important 
flaw: It fails to capture American property law’s federal structure.42 Indeed, the 
fact that property forms differ across jurisdictions ensures that the “closed” list 
of property forms in any given jurisdiction is in a constant state of flux and 
development.43 
To highlight the importance of federalism, we will examine some of the 
many property doctrines that have been fundamentally altered by it. 
Specifically, we examine several menus of property forms—cotenancies, 
easements, and continuing intellectual property rights (for example, droit de 
suite)—whose diversity is enhanced by the variety of options offered by 
different states. 
At the outset, we stress that this survey is far from complete. Besides the 
doctrines specifically mentioned here, many other property rules have been 
caught up in the maelstrom of federal competition. For instance, as Robert 
Sitkoff and Max Schanzenbach demonstrate, competition for trust funds, 
driven by changes in the tax code, has led states to revamp their approach to 
the Rule Against Perpetuities.44 
A. Cotenancies 
Common law recognized three main types of concurrent ownership 
interests: joint tenancies, tenancies in common, and tenancies by the entirety.45 
A joint tenancy is characterized by joint ownership in the asset as a whole with 
                                                                                                                      
42.  Other aspects of property are also difficult to reconcile with the information-based thesis 
propounded by Merrill and Smith. Their theory is predicated on an incomplete analysis of 
the nature of property rights and their costs and benefits. While information costs certainly 
play a role in shaping property law, they hardly exhaust the cost-benefit calculus involved in 
determining the efficacy of property rules. We address this issue at greater length in 
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531 (2005). 
43.  To be sure, Merrill and Smith considered “idiosyncratic property rights” to be the bane of 
their approach, and nothing in the federal structure allows such personalized rights. See 
Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 26-34. Nonetheless, the availability of a wide variety of 
available property forms across jurisdictions belies the strict numerus clausus approach. 
44.  See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An 
Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2005). 
45.  DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 339. Dukeminier and Krier noted that coparceny, 
also recognized at common law, was “early eliminated” from the American colonies. Id. at 
339 n.2. Similar to a tenancy in common and contemporaneous with primogeniture, 
coparceny described the cotenancy held by the daughters of a decedent lacking a male heir. 
Dukeminier and Krier also noted that a handful of other types of concurrent tenancies were 
known at common law. Id. at 339. 
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a right of survivorship.46 Traditionally, a joint tenancy required the presence of 
four unities: unity of title, unity of time, unity of possession, and unity of 
interest.47 Tenancies in common, by contrast, never required the four unities. 
They differ in effect from joint tenancies primarily in that they do not create a 
right of survivorship.48 Tenancies by the entirety, the third option, are very 
similar to joint tenancies. Like joint tenancies, they require the presence of the 
four unities, and are accompanied by a right of survivorship. However, 
tenancies by the entirety differ in two important respects. First, they may only 
be adopted by married couples, meaning that they require a fifth unity—the 
unity of marriage. Second, tenants by the entirety wishing to transfer their 
property interest must generally secure their cotenant’s permission to do so.49 
While these three property forms may appear to exhaust the menu of 
available cotenancies, in fact, potential cotenants have a plethora of options, 
thanks to differences among the states. 
1. Tenancy by the Entirety 
Tenancy by the entirety has fallen into disfavor in recent decades, leading 
to a remarkable diversity of approaches to such tenancies in the United States. 
Many states have abolished tenancies by the entirety altogether.50 In states that 
have retained this regime, a wide variety of rules has emerged regarding the 
                                                                                                                      
46.  Id. at 340. 
47.  Blackstone formulated the doctrine thus: 
The properties of a joint estate are derived from it’s unity, which is fourfold; the 
unity of interest, the unity of title, the unity of time, and the unity of possession: or, 
in other words, joint-tenants have one and the same interest, accruing by one and 
the same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and 
the same undivided possession. 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *180. 
48.  DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 340. 
49.  See Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1530 (2003) (noting that most 
jurisdictions “require[] a joint act by both spouses so that only the marital unit, as opposed 
to any individual spouse, has the right of control” over property held by the entirety). 
50.  7 POWELL, supra note 19, § 52.03[3], at 52-22 to -24 (noting that tenancy by the entirety has 
been abolished in California, Connecticut, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin); see also 
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 384 (discussing the Married Women’s Property Acts, 
which “removed the disabilities of coverture and gave a married woman, like a single 
woman, control over all her property as separate and immune from her husband’s debts”); 
Peter M. Carrozzo, Tenancies in Antiquity: A Transformation of Concurrent Ownership for 
Modern Relationships, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 423 (2001) (discussing the historical bases and 
evolution of cotenancies). 
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effect of purported unilateral transfers.51 One group of states allows unilateral 
transfers, so long as the property interest remains subject to a right of 
survivorship,52 another prohibits all unilateral transfers,53 and a third group 
bars creditors from levying on the debtor-spouse’s right of possession but 
permits them to levy on the debtor-spouse’s right of survivorship.54 States are 
also divided as to the types of assets that may be held in tenancy by the 
entirety, with most, but not all, permitting only interests in land to be so 
held.55 
2. Joint Tenancies 
As we noted above, common law recognized a joint tenancy only when the 
four unities were present. However, many states have recently recognized joint 
tenancies even when one of the unities is missing. Thus, the law of various 
jurisdictions reveals a considerable disagreement as to whether a joint tenancy 
survives a joint tenant’s fictional “conveyance” to herself. California, for 
example, permits a joint tenant to terminate a joint tenancy—and extinguish 
                                                                                                                      
51.  See Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977) (discussing the effect of unilateral transfers 
on tenancy by the entirety in various jurisdictions); see also Dagan, supra note 49, at 1529-30 
(“Contemporary law is divided on the question of whether one spouse can transfer his or 
her interest in the entireties property during marriage, as well as on the corresponding 
power of that spouse’s creditors to subject the debtor-spouse’s interest in the entireties 
estate to creditors’ claims.”). 
52.  See, e.g., Coraccio v. Lowell Five Cents Sav. Bank, 612 N.E.2d 650 (Mass. 1993) (interpreting 
a statute equalizing rights of spouses in entireties and holding that one spouse may 
mortgage his or her interest in such property without the other spouse’s consent, subject to 
the other spouse’s survivorship right). 
53.  See, e.g., Estate of Lampert v. Estate of Lampert, 896 P.2d 214 (Alaska 1995) (applying 
Hawaii law); Sawada, 561 P.2d at 1295; Arbesman v. Winer, 468 A.2d 633, 638 (Md. 1983) 
(holding that neither spouse can make an effective lease without joinder of the other); Elko 
v. Elko, 49 A.2d 441 (Md. 1946). 
54.  See, e.g., King v. Greene, 153 A.2d 49 (N.J. 1959) (holding that a creditor’s interest attaches 
to the debtor-spouse’s interest after the death of the other spouse); Stauffer v. Stauffer, 351 
A.2d 236, 245 (Pa. 1976) (holding that only the survivorship right can be unilaterally 
transferred, or seized by creditors). Additionally, a de facto federal law of tenancies by the 
entirety permits forfeiture of rights of survivorship, but not of current possession. United 
States v. 1500 Lincoln Avenue, 949 F.2d 73, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1991). 
55.  John V. Orth notes that an “exception to the rule of no holding of personalty in tenancy by 
the entirety is recognized in cases in which realty held in that estate is converted into its 
money value without the consent of both owners. The usual case of ‘involuntary conversion’ 
occurs when real property is taken by condemnation.” John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: 
The Strange Career of the Common-Law Marital Estate, 1997 BYU L. REV. 35, 47 n.60 (citing 
Ronan v. Ronan, 159 N.E.2d 653 (Mass. 1959)). 
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the other joint tenant’s right of survivorship—by self-conveyance.56 By 
contrast, until 2004 Nebraska held to the traditional common law rule that 
requires a real conveyance—i.e., a transfer to a third party—in order to break 
the unities of time and title, and thereby terminate a joint tenancy.57 New York, 
taking a middle position, allows a self-conveyance to sever a joint tenancy, but 
only if the conveyance is properly recorded so as to impart notice to the other 
cotenant.58 A similar split of authority can be found on the effects of divorce,59 
and executions of mortgages60 or leaseholds,61 on the continued existence of a 
joint tenancy.62 
As we discuss later in this Part, joint tenancy underwent an even more 
thorough reform in the twentieth century, as many states sought to abolish the 
right of survivorship by statute. Ultimately, however, these states revived the 
right of survivorship in joint tenancies.63 
                                                                                                                      
56.  CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 683.2 (West Supp. 2005); Riddle v. Harmon, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 
(Ct. App. 1980); see also Minonk State Bank v. Grassman, 432 N.E.2d 386, 387 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1982); Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 161 N.W.2d 688, 691-92 (Minn. 
1968); In re Estate of Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969 (Utah 1996). 
57.  Krause v. Crossley, 277 N.W.2d 242, 246 (Neb. 1979) (“Here the cotenant . . . attempted to 
sever the joint tenancy by a deed from himself as grantor to himself as grantee. We now 
hold that this act does not constitute a severance of the joint tenancy and that the right of 
survivorship at the time of the death of [the cotenant] was in the plaintiff . . . .”); see also R. 
H. Helmholz, Realism and Formalism in the Severance of Joint Tenancies, 77 NEB. L. REV. 1, 12-
13 (1998) (discussing the history of Nebraska’s adherence to traditional rules of joint 
tenancy). The Nebraska General Assembly overruled Krause in 2004. See NEB. REV. STAT  
§ 76-118 (2004). 
58.  See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 240-c (McKinney Supp. 2005) (stating that no unilateral 
transfer by a joint tenant “shall terminate the right of survivorship of any non-severing joint 
tenant or tenants as to the severing tenant’s interest unless the deed or written instrument 
effecting the severance is recorded, prior to the death of the severing tenant, in the county 
where the real property is located”). 
59.  “Some courts have held that a joint tenancy is not automatically extinguished as a result of 
the dissolution of the marriage of the joint tenants.” 7 POWELL, supra note 19, § 51.04[3], at 
51-23 to -24. 
60.  See, e.g., Downing v. Downing, 606 A.2d 208 (Md. 1992) (holding that neither a mortgage 
on the property executed by all joint tenants nor an agreement between joint tenants 
conferring upon one the exclusive right to receive income from the property will sever the 
joint tenancy); Eder v. Rothamel, 95 A.2d 860, 863 (Md. 1953) (holding that conveyance of 
a mortgage destroys the unity of title (citing Musa v. Segelke & Kohlhaus Co., 272 N.W. 637 
(Wis. 1937))). 
61.  See, e.g., Tehnet v. Bosell, 554 P.2d 330, 335 (Cal. 1976) (holding that a lease does not break 
the unities); Alexander v. Boyer, 253 A.2d 359, 364 (Md. 1969) (holding that a lease breaks 
the unities). 
62.  See generally Helmholz, supra note 57. 
63.  See infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text. 
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3. Community Property 
The emergence of community-property regimes in a handful of states has 
further expanded the menu of options for concurrent ownership. In 
community-property states, spouses interested in co-ownership of property 
may reject the traditional common law cotenancies and instead hold assets as 
community property. Community property is considered to be owned by the 
spouses as a single unit and is therefore subject to joint management. 
However, community property does not carry with it a right of survivorship.64 
Dissolution of the marriage by divorce terminates the community-property 
regime; depending on the state, the community property is then divided 
according to the principle of either equal or joint distribution.65 
Community-property states also divide on the question of what incoming 
property becomes community property or separate property. For instance, 
some states, including Idaho66 and Texas,67 assign community-property status 
to income from separate property, while others view such income as separate 
property.68 
The issue of marital property is further complicated by two factors. First, 
states are divided on whether marital property regimes are mandatory or 
optional. Common law property regimes are generally optional, meaning that 
couples may decide in what form to own their property.69 Couples may decide 
upon separate ownership of assets, or upon one or another form of joint 
tenancy. Community-property regimes, however, are generally mandatory. 
Thus, property acquired by one spouse’s earnings automatically becomes 
community property.70 Alaska, however, is an elective community-property 
state in which couples have the option of holding property as a community or 
separately.71 Most states also allow the voluntary transmutation of property 
                                                                                                                      
64.  DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 421. 
65.  7 POWELL, supra note 19, § 53.07[1], at 53-100 to -101. 
66.  IDAHO CODE §§ 32-906, 32-906A (1996 & Supp. 2005). 
67.  TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.001-.002 (Vernon 1998). 
68.  See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.16.010-.020 (West 2005). 
69.  Wisconsin, for example, provides such an optional community-property scheme. 7 POWELL, 
supra note 19, § 53.02[1], at 53-4 to -26. 
70.  Community-property states may, however, preserve separate ownership for “property 
acquired before marriage and property acquired during marriage by gift, devise, or descent.” 
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 420. 
71.  See ALASKA STAT. § 34.77.030 (2004). Indeed, Alaska invites nonresidents to opt into Alaska 
community-property law by creating an Alaska community-property trust. See JESSE 
DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 456 (7th ed. 2005). 
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forms by agreement, permitting spouses to transform community property to 
separate property or vice versa.72 
Second, and more confusingly, marital property issues are becoming 
increasingly complicated as a result of growing gaps between states concerning 
the legal recognition of marital status. Massachusetts has recognized the rights 
of same-sex couples to marry,73 while Vermont74 (and perhaps California75) has 
granted such couples the right to form civil unions carrying the same legal 
status. This would seem to grant same-sex partners the ability to obtain marital 
or quasi-marital status in one of these states, and, by extension, the right to 
enjoy the property rights attendant to marital status in any state in the 
Union.76 However, in 1996, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), which granted states the right not to recognize the validity of acts 
respecting a same-sex relationship “that is treated as a marriage” or to give 
effect to rights and claims “arising from such [a] relationship.”77 While many 
scholars have argued that DOMA exceeds congressional power under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause,78 others have argued for the validity of the Act.79 
                                                                                                                      
72.  See 7 POWELL, supra note 19, § 53.03[1][b1], at 53-32. 
73.  Goodridge v. Dep’t Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
74.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1202, 1204 (2002). 
75.  While the California Supreme Court halted same-sex marriages in 2004 in Lockyer v. City 
and County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004), the court did not rule on the 
constitutionality of such marriages. 
76.  Such, for example, was the case with Nevada divorce when that state’s liberal rules for 
marriage dissolution altered property rights for divorcing couples throughout the Union. 
Once couples obtained a Nevada divorce, their home states were required to give “full faith 
and credit” to the divorce, leading, for example, to the dissolution of tenancies by the 
entirety and other property forms affected by marital status. See NELSON M. BLAKE, THE 
ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES 181-88 (1962). According to 
Blake: 
By the 1920’s the Nevada courts were granting about 1,000 divorces a year; after 
the residence requirement was reduced to three months, production more than 
doubled with over 2,500 divorces in 1928. The effect of the 1931 law reducing 
residence to six weeks was equally dramatic. The rate again doubled, and in 1931 
there were 5,260 Nevada divorces. Annual production fell off somewhat during 
the later years of the Great Depression, but soared wildly under the impact of 
World War II, reaching 11,000 in 1943 and 20,500 in 1946. Thereafter, it subsided 
to a more or less stable level of between 9,000 and 10,000 a year during the later 
1950’s. 
Id. at 158-59. 
77.  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)). 
78.  See, e.g., Paige E. Chabora, Congress’ Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the 
Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 604, 649 (1997); Scott Fruehwald, Choice of 
Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 51 FLA. L. REV. 799, 812 (1999); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex 
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Additionally, some have argued that cases recognizing a “public policy” 
exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause would allow states to refuse 
recognition to foreign same-sex marriages even in the absence of DOMA.80 As 
of April 2003, thirty-seven states had enacted laws denying local effect to same-
sex marriages and civil unions recognized in other states.81 Today, one must 
check the chain of marital status as well as the chain of property rights in order 
to determine the legal status of property ownership. Thus, for example, a 
purchaser of an automobile from one member of a same-sex couple from a 
community-property state would have to see if the automobile was purchased 
as community property and whether the same-sex couple was entitled at the 
time of purchase to the marital rights to create such a property status. 
4. The Rise and Fall of Cotenancies 
The dynamism in property forms can be seen by examining not only 
differences between state policies, but also the development of property forms 
over time. The question of whether there is vibrant competition for property 
law regimes is an empirical one beyond the scope of this Essay. Nonetheless, 
                                                                                                                      
Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921, 974 (1998); Letter from 
Laurence H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Senator Edward M. Kennedy (May 24, 
1996), reprinted in 142 CONG. REC. S13,359-61 (daily ed. June 6, 1996). 
79.  Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Same-Sex Marriages and the Defense of Marriage Act: A Deviant View of 
an Experiment in Full Faith and Credit, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 409, 456 (1998) (arguing for 
the validity of DOMA under the “Effect Clause”); Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North 
Carolina, Divorce Recognition, and Same-Sex Marriage Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 187, 
223 (1998) (same); Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255, 391-92 (1998) (same). 
80.  See, e.g., Emily J. Sack, Domestic Violence Across State Lines: The Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
Congressional Power, and Interstate Enforcement of Protection Orders, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 827, 
888-89 (2004) (“[S]ome advocates and scholars on both sides of the DOMA debate 
acknowledged that due to the ‘public policy exception,’ other states with connection to the 
parties likely would not have to recognize same-sex marriages from another state. 
Opponents of the legislation therefore argued it was unnecessary because the Constitution 
itself would not require states to give the same-sex marriages recognition.”). The public 
policy exception permits states to refuse to recognize the validity of foreign states’ acts when 
such recognition would “involve an improper interference with important interests of the 
sister State.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 (1971). Others, however, 
argue that the public policy exception is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex 
Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 
(1997). 
81.  See Leigh Jones, Gay Partner May Pursue Wrongful Death as Spouse, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 15, 2003, 
at 1 (“[W]hile 37 other states have used the federal law to pass their own laws establishing 
that they do not recognize same-sex unions in other jurisdictions, some 13 states, New York 
among them, have not codified the apparent power that the Defense of Marriage Act 
provides to states.”). 
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several episodes in the history of cotenancy law in the United States suggest 
that property doctrines at the state level do not stand in place, but rather 
change in response to the give and take of politics. 
Several states tried to do away with the right of survivorship as a feature of 
joint tenancies.82 Among these states were North Carolina in 178483 and 
Pennsylvania in 1812.84 Generally, the explanation for the abolition was 
straightforward: Given the ability of parties to pass property to one another 
through testamentary instruments, there was no need for a special form of 
property that would allow a person to take up ownership automatically upon 
death of a cotenant.85 Yet, political forces—concerned with the ability to pass 
property without probate—inexorably pushed toward the recreation of the 
survivorship right. 
Thus, for instance, Ohio courts eliminated joint tenancies with 
survivorship in the 1826 decision Sergeant v. Steinberger,86 but later recognized 
the ability of parties to create an effective “joint and survivorship deed.”87 
North Carolina reversed its abolition act in 1991, thereby allowing the creation 
of a joint tenancy with survivorship, while preserving an interpretive 
presumption against survivorship.88 Pennsylvania reached a similar result by 
judicial interpretation of the relevant statute in 1934.89 Tenancies by the 
entirety underwent a different reform. At common law, the husband was 
entitled to possess, manage, and control the assets during the marriage.90 This 
                                                                                                                      
82.  See supra text accompanying note 63. 
83.  Act of 1784, ch. 22, § VI (repealed 1991), reprinted in 24 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH 
CAROLINA 574 (Walter Clark ed., 1904). 
84.  Act of Mar. 31, 1812, ch. 194, 1812 Pa. Laws 259 (codified at 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 110 
(West 2004)). 
85.  See John V. Orth, Joint Tenancy Law, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 173 (2002). 
86.  2 Ohio 305 (1826). 
87.  Curlis v. Pursley, 10 Ohio Misc. 266, 270-71 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1967). 
88.  Act of July 12, 1990, ch. 891, § 1, 1990 N.C. Sess. Laws 224 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
41-2 (2004)); see John V. Orth, The Joint Tenancy Makes a Comeback in North Carolina, 69 
N.C. L. REV. 491 (1991). 
89.  In re Lowry’s Estate, 171 A. 878 (Pa. 1934) (holding that while the statute abolished the right 
of survivorship as an incident of joint tenancy, it did not prevent the creation of such a right 
either by devise or grant in deed). We present no broader theory about the importance of 
particular branches of government in the shaping of property. For one interesting 
perspective on the struggle between legislature and judiciary, see Carol M. Rose, Crystals and 
Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988). 
90.  See Kathy T. Graham, The Uniform Marital Property Act: A Solution for Common Law Property 
Systems?, 48 S.D. L. REV. 455, 457 (2003) (“[A]t common law husbands were generally the 
titleholders or managers of all the marital property since married women were unable to 
own or manage property given the disabilities of married women.”); Orth, supra note 55, at 
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inequitable feature of the estate, however, was abolished over the course of the 
twentieth century.91 Today, tenancy by the entirety, where it exists, provides 
for equality between spouses. 
B. Easements 
While subject to less dramatic changes than the law of cotenancies, 
easements have also been subject to a variety of approaches throughout the 
United States. Easements are property interests in realty (or personalty)92 that 
grant owners use rights but not possessory rights. Traditionally, only a handful 
of use rights and restrictions were cognizable at common law as easements. 
Outside this list, any agreement between parties regarding the use of assets 
would create no property rights. Nevertheless, a number of new easements 
have been recognized in various U.S. jurisdictions, as have new means for 
creating them.93 
Easements may be classified as either affirmative or negative. Affirmative 
easements grant the easement-holder the right to use the servient property in a 
certain manner—such as the right to cross neighboring property by foot—
while negative easements bar the servient property owner from certain uses—
such as blocking water flow.94 English common law recognized only four types 
of negative easements: “[T]he right to stop your neighbor from (1) blocking 
your windows, (2) interfering with air flowing to your land in a defined 
channel, (3) removing the support of your building (usually by excavating or 
removing a supporting wall), and (4) interfering with the flow of water in an 
artificial stream.”95 Additionally, negative easements could only be appurtenant 
(for the benefit of a property) and not in gross (for the benefit of a person).96 
                                                                                                                      
42-43 (noting that “[w]ell past the middle of the twentieth century, [tenancy by the 
entirety] was still male-dominated in a number of states”). 
91.  Orth, supra note 55, at 43 (“[I]n a process not completed until late in the twentieth century, 
state after state legislated to equalize the rights of the spouses over property held in the 
tenancy by the entirety.”). 
92.  See Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449 (2004). 
93.  In addition to the approaches to privately held easements we mention here, there are a 
variety of state rules regarding public easements. For instance, in some states, courts are 
generous in creating prescriptive public easements, or the equivalent, in order to promote 
access to coastal beaches. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices (Public Use of Coastal Beaches), 
649 A.2d 604, 610 (N.H. 1994); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 
(N.J. 1984). 
94.  JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND ¶ 2.03, 
at 2-14 to -17 (rev. ed. 1998). 
95.  DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 855 (footnote omitted). 
96.  See 4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34A.01 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 
2000). 
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American law also traditionally limited the types of negative easements that 
could be recognized.97 However, many states have expanded the list beyond 
the traditional four. Perhaps the most famous new easement is the 
conservation easement, which is essentially a negative easement in gross that 
prevents development of land that is harmful to the environment.98 The 
purposes of conservation easements include: “retaining or protecting natural, 
scenic, or open-space values of real property, assuring its availability for 
agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural 
resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water quality, [and] preserving the 
historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.”99 
Under the common law, the conservation easement would be impossible. It 
prevents a use beyond the four traditional prohibitions recognized under 
English law, and it runs in gross rather than being appurtenant.100 Yet, in the 
past fifty years, many states have provided for conservation easements,101 
including the eighteen states and the District of Columbia that have adopted 
the Uniform Conservation Easement Act.102 In fact, only Wyoming, 
Pennsylvania, North Dakota, and Oklahoma continue to prohibit the form.103 
Permissible conservation easements have varied widely among those states that 
permit them. For instance, some states’ conservation easements “cover only 
land conservation, while others cover both land conservation and historic 
preservation.”104 
C. Droit de Suite 
Copyright law extends the domain of property law to intangible expressive 
works. Under the United States Copyright Act, the initial copyright vests in the 
author of the work.105 Authors may subsequently assign their rights to others 
                                                                                                                      
97.  DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 857 (“In the main, American courts accepted the 
English restrictions on creating new types of [negative] easements.”). 
98.  See Sarah C. Smith, Note, A Public Trust Argument for Public Access to Private Conservation 
Land, 52 DUKE L.J. 629, 633 (2002). 
99.  UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 170 (1996). 
100.  Peter M. Morrisette, Conservation Easements and the Public Good: Preserving the Environment 
on Private Lands, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 373, 381 (2001) (noting that “conservation easements 
are an anomaly without precedent in the common law of easements”). 
101.  Id. at 384-85 (discussing the legislation of conservation easements by states). 
102.  Id. at 385. 
103.  Id. 
104.  Id. at 384. 
105.  17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000). 
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and, if they do, they are no longer entitled to a share in the profits from the 
resale of the work. 
However, a minority property doctrine, in force in the state of California, 
creates and preserves a continuing property right for the artist who created the 
work. This right, known as the droit de suite, is recognized under the California 
Resale Royalties Act (CRRA).106 It provides that when a work of fine art—
defined as “an original painting, sculpture, or drawing, or an original work of 
art in glass”107—is resold, payment must also be made to the artist (or 
successors for twenty years after the artist’s death).108 The artist’s right to a 
share in the proceeds of a resale exists notwithstanding the artist’s previous 
transfer of all ownership of the artwork that is the subject of the sale. Indeed, 
without such a transfer, the CRRA preserves no rights for the artist.109 
In order for the CRRA to apply, the seller must be a California resident at 
the time of the resale, or the resale must take place within California.110 Artists 
may not transfer or waive their right to royalties except by a written contract 
“providing for an amount in excess of 5 percent of the amount of such 
[re]sale.”111 
ii. the value of state competition 
In this Part, we discuss the utility of interstate competition for property 
regimes. Our analysis incorporates two rich literatures: the elaborate body of 
work on state competition in corporate law and the scholarship spawned by 
Charles Tiebout on competition over the provision of local public goods. In 
addition, we examine the mechanisms through which federalism produces 
political change, and we tie the scholarship concerning competition to Albert 
Hirschman’s analysis of voice and exit as instruments of policy shaping. We 
conclude this Part by discussing how our analysis ties into the existing 
scholarship on the production of various property forms and rights. 
                                                                                                                      
106.  CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 986 (West 1982 & Supp. 2005); cf. Morsenburg v. Baylon, 621 F.2d 
972 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that § 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act does not preempt the 
California legislation because the latter merely provides a supplemental right to the 
copyright holders). 
107.  CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 986(c)(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 2005). 
108.  Id. § 986(a)(7). 
109.  Id. § 986(a), (b)(5). The artist’s share on resale is a royalty equal to five percent of the gross 
resale price (unless the resale price is under $1,000 or less than the price previously paid by 
seller); the duty to pay falls upon the seller or the seller’s agent. Id. § 986(a)(1), (b)(4), 
(b)(5). 
110.  Id. § 986(a). 
111.  Id. 
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A. State Competition in Corporate Law 
The rich literature on the effects of interstate competition for corporate law 
provides a natural starting point for our analysis. This body of scholarship 
developed in two stages. The first salvo in the debate was fired by William 
Cary, who famously stated that competition among states to attract 
corporations generates a “race for the bottom.”112 According to Cary, corporate 
managers seek out the regulatory regime most favorable to their schemes at the 
expense of the shareholders. Cary’s bleak prediction was inextricably related to 
the agency problem that is the underlying concern of much corporate law. The 
agency problem arises out of the divergence of interests between the principal 
and agent, and posits that one cannot always presume that the agent will serve 
the interests of the principal rather than her own. In the corporate context, the 
shareholders are the principals and formal owners of the corporation, but they 
must entrust the daily operations to an agent, the professional management, 
which enjoys effective immunity from shareholder oversight. 
Cary’s pessimism was soon countered by a much more optimistic view. In a 
famous article, Judge Ralph Winter argued that state competition would 
actually lead to a race to the top.113 In Winter’s view, shareholders would invest 
only in companies subject to regulatory regimes that curbed managerial excess. 
The result, wrote Winter, would be that the need for capital to fund corporate 
activities would force managers to incorporate in those states whose legal 
regimes reliably overcame the agency problem and protected shareholders.114 
Soon, however, the Winter-Cary debate was eclipsed by a more 
fundamental question—is there, in fact, any race at all? Michael Klausner 
pointed out that Delaware leads the nation in incorporations by a substantial 
margin. The dominance of Delaware’s corporate law leads to “network 
externalities” that make Delaware a superior choice for a prospective 
corporation, irrespective of the attractiveness of its corporate law.115 
Subsequently, Ehud Kamar, alone and together with Marcel Kahan, took 
                                                                                                                      
112.  William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 
705 (1974). 
113.  Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). 
114.  Cf. Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 
709, 732-37 (1987) (reviewing empirical studies of state competition and arguing that “to the 
extent they can be used to buttress any position, it is the value-maximizing view associated 
with Ralph Winter”). 
115.  Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 
844 (1995) (pointing out that “network externalities may have increased the value of the 
Delaware charter and created a self-reinforcing dynamic that extended Delaware’s lead” 
(footnote omitted)). 
BELL PARCH OCT 19 NO HEADER 11/1/2005  5:12:48 PM 
the yale law journal 115:72   2005  
94 
 
Klausner’s insight a step further by positing that Delaware enjoys a monopoly 
position in the market for incorporations, calling into question the ability of 
other states to compete with Delaware.116 And, indeed, recent contributions to 
the debate support the view that there is no robust competition among states in 
this context. For example, Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani have suggested 
that the alleged “race” for incorporations never transpired, and that the process 
would be more aptly described as a “leisurely walk.”117 
There are three important differences between the corporate context and 
the property context. First, much of the controversy about the competition for 
efficient corporate law concerns the agency problem. As noted previously, Cary 
feared a race to the bottom in which corporate managers would choose 
jurisdictions that benefited their interests at the expense of shareholders.118 
However, property law typically does not involve such a clash of interests—the 
owner seeks to take advantage of favorable laws to enhance the value of her 
own assets. 
Second, in the property context, no state enjoys Delaware’s dominant 
status.119 While New York and California are highly influential, one cannot 
summarize the law of property by focusing exclusively on these two states. On 
many doctrinal questions, New York and California law are in diametric 
opposition. At a risk of mild overstatement, it may be said that New York 
property law is somewhat conservative and static, while California’s is marked 
by sometimes controversial innovations.120 Moreover, important cases in the 
                                                                                                                      
116.  Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 679, 748 (2002) (concluding that states do not compete over incorporations and that 
Delaware enjoys a monopoly status); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of 
Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1910 (1998) (arguing that 
“Delaware has market power that allows it to engage in anticompetitive behavior”). 
117.  Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the 
Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 553 (2002). However, Melvin 
Eisenberg, and later Mark Roe, have pointed out that although Delaware is virtually 
immune to competition from other states, it faces potential competition from the federal 
government, which may at any time increase its regulatory oversight. Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1512 (1989) (noting 
that potential intervention by the federal government provides a check on Delaware’s ability 
to abuse its dominance); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) 
(discussing the possible effects of federal regulations on Delaware law). 
118.  See Cary, supra note 112. 
119.  According to Sitkoff and Schanzenbach, Delaware, South Dakota, and Alaska are the 
dominant states in jurisdictional competition over trust law. See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, 
supra note 44. 
120.  Most notably, New York generally follows the traditional common law rule against 
perpetuities, see DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 334, and refuses to impose a duty to 
mitigate damages on landlords, see Holy Prop. Ltd. v. Kenneth Cole Prod., 661 N.E.2d 694, 
696 (N.Y. 1995). 
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property canon come from various jurisdictions in the United States, ranging 
from Massachusetts121 and New Jersey122 to Minnesota123 and Oregon.124 
Third, there are more significant barriers to creating property rights in 
different states than there are to forming corporations. Particularly when realty 
is concerned, the choice among property regimes may entail choosing between 
highly imperfect substitutes. Real estate in one location is never the precise 
equivalent of real estate in another, and the law governing property rights in 
such real estate is invariably that of the realty’s situs. Even when chattels are 
concerned, creating property rights in another state may involve significant 
costs, such as relocating one’s residence. The result is that the gains to be 
enjoyed from another state’s property regime must be rather large before it is 
cost-effective to take steps to fall under the competitor’s property law. 
Although Delaware currently dominates the market for incorporation, it 
did not always enjoy this position. Until the end of the nineteenth century, 
New Jersey dominated the market. Between 1888 and 1899, forty-two percent 
of the companies whose value exceeded one million dollars were chartered in 
that state; in 1899, the percentage climbed to fifty-five percent.125 In that same 
year, in a conscious attempt to challenge New Jersey’s dominance, Delaware 
enacted its General Corporation Laws.126 To a large extent, Delaware’s 
                                                                                                                      
121.  Massachusetts is credited as the first state to recognize conservation easements. See Jean 
Hocker, Foreword to PROTECTING THE LAND, supra note 6, at xvii. 
122.  Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12 (1821) (holding that “the navigable rivers, where the tide 
ebbs and flows, the ports, the bays, the coasts of the sea, including both the water and the 
land under the water, for the purposes of passing and repassing, navigation, fishing, 
fowling, sustenance, and all the other uses of the water and its products” are held in public 
trust for the benefit of the residents of New Jersey). 
123.  Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 161 N.W.2d 688, 691-92 (Minn. 1968) 
(holding that a joint tenancy may be terminated and transformed into a tenancy in common 
by a unilateral conveyance to oneself); see also Helmholz, supra note 57, at 10 (stating that 
Hendrickson was the first case to recognize this option). 
124.  State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969) (declaring an easement for the public 
over Oregon’s privately owned dried sand beaches based on the doctrine of custom); Steven 
W. Bender, Castles in the Sand: Balancing Public Custom and Private Ownership Interests on 
Oregon’s Beaches, 77 OR. L. REV. 913, 913-14 (1998) (“Nationally, Oregon is credited with, 
and sometimes criticized for, resuscitating the custom doctrine as applied to beach rights.”). 
Credit for being the first state to invoke the custom doctrine to declare rights in the public 
should arguably go to Hawaii. See In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968) (locating seaward 
boundaries at the upper reaches of the wash of waves on grounds of Hawaiian custom). 
125.  See RUSSELL CARPENTER LARCOM, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION 12-13 (1937). 
126.  See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 116, at 727 n.171 (describing how Delaware challenged New 
Jersey). 
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legislation was a copy of New Jersey’s corporate law,127 but the former was 
subsequently complemented by a marketing campaign designed to promote 
Delaware’s reputation as an appealing locale for incorporation.128 Furthermore, 
over time, the Delaware legislature updated its General Corporate Laws to 
remain attractive to corporations. The story of Delaware illustrates that 
competition among states is in fact possible and that the target audience, in this 
case corporations, responds to innovative approaches by states. 
B. The Tiebout Hypothesis 
A second reference point for our analysis is the Tiebout hypothesis.129 In a 
pathbreaking article, Charles Tiebout set out to challenge the view that public 
goods may not be provided efficiently due to the absence of an effective 
mechanism for the public to reveal its preferences.130 Tiebout commenced his 
analysis by pointing to an important difference between central and local 
government with respect to the provision of public goods.131 He observed that 
at the central (or federal) level, the preferences of the citizens are a given, and 
the government must adjust to them.132 At the local level, however, localities 
can compete to attract residents by varying their revenue and expenditure 
patterns, and residents can then choose among these localities by moving to the 
one that best fits their preferences (“voting with their feet”).133 As Tiebout 
noted, the greater the number of communities and the larger the variance 
between them, the closer individuals will come to satisfying their 
preferences.134 This analysis led Tiebout to conclude that under certain 
conditions, it is possible to achieve efficient provision of local public goods.135 
                                                                                                                      
127.  See Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 454 (Del. Ch. 1934) (“[I]t is common knowledge 
that the general act of this state adopted in 1899 was modeled after the then existing New 
Jersey act.”). 
128.  See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 116, at 727 n.171 (noting that “[t]he adoption of 
[Delaware’s] new code was followed by vigorous marketing efforts”). 
129.  See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
130.  This view was associated with the economists Richard Musgrave and Paul Samuelson. See 
Richard Abel Musgrave, The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Public Economy, 53 Q.J. ECON. 213 
(1939); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. STAT. 387, 
388-89 (1954). 
131.  Tiebout, supra note 129, at 418. 
132.  Id. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. 
135.  Id. at 420. Tiebout’s specific assumptions were that: (1) Each consumer-voter is fully mobile 
and selects the community that best satisfies his preferences for public goods; (2) consumer-
voters have full knowledge of differences; (3) there are a large number of communities; (4) 
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Tiebout’s analysis has become a classic in legal scholarship. His basic 
insight was subsequently applied to myriad legal fields, ranging from 
environmental law136 to banking137 to antitrust.138 At least to some extent, the 
Tiebout hypothesis has found support in empirical studies.139 These studies 
suggest that migration patterns between city and suburbs are significantly 
affected by tax levels and investment in education.140 
What are the implications of the Tiebout hypothesis for competition over 
property forms? In the United States, property law is a local public good that 
fits Tiebout’s framework of analysis.141 In addressing this question, then, it is 
necessary to take account of two unique characteristics of property law as a 
                                                                                                                      
there are no restrictions due to employment opportunities; (5) public services exhibit no 
economies or diseconomies between communities; (6) each community has an optimal 
community size (number of residents for which a bundle of services can be produced at the 
lowest cost); and (7) communities seek to maintain optimal community size. Id. at 419. 
136.  See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) 
(arguing that competition among states over environmental regulation will not lead to a race 
to the bottom). Revesz’s article was a response to two articles by Richard Stewart, both 
positing that competition among states over environmental regulation will lead to a race to 
the bottom. Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional 
Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 
IOWA L. REV. 713, 747 (1977); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism 
in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212 
(1977). 
137.  See Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1977) (suggesting that federal and state regulators compete over bank 
charters). But see Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual 
Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 693-707 (1988) (employing public choice theory to 
argue that the competition between federal and state regulators identified by Scott does not 
exist, and recommending devolution to the state level in order to create competition). 
138.  See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 23-25 
(1983). 
139.  E.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional 
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 524 (1991) (“Many studies have shown that 
middle-class migration between the city and the suburbs is significantly affected by the 
disparity . . . between city and suburban spending for education.”); Georgette C. 
Poindexter, Collective Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal City, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 607, 615 
(1997) (“Empirical data, in fact, bear out the Tiebout hypothesis.”). 
140.  See William A. Fischel, Did John Serrano Vote for Proposition 13? A Reply to Stark and Zasloff’s 
Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause Proposition 13?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 887 
(2004); Poindexter, supra note 139, at 615. However, a recent empirical study by Paul Rhode 
and Koleman Strumpf suggests that long-run trends in geographic sorting are inconsistent 
with the Tiebout hypothesis. Paul W. Rhode & Koleman S. Strumpf, Assessing the 
Importance of Tiebout Sorting: Local Heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1648 
(2003). 
141.  See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Opting In or Opting Out: The New Legal Process or 
Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1087, 1092-97 (1999) (characterizing law as a public good). 
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subject of state competition. First, the fact that property forms are produced on 
the state level, not the local level, dramatically increases the relocation costs 
individuals must incur to change property regimes. By contrast to competition 
over education, which requires relatively modest moves from the city to the 
suburbs or from one suburb to another, competition over property forms 
entails significant changes in lifestyle. Second, by contrast to natural amenities, 
the law may be transported to other places. That is, it is not necessary for 
individuals to live in a particular place in order to enjoy a legal regime that 
exists there; laws may, in principle, be imported by people in other locales. 
Together, these factors suggest that while Tiebout competition is probably less 
robust today for property law than for local amenities, increasing the 
portability of state property law should make it quite amenable to Tiebout 
competition. 
C. Politics and the Production of Property Law 
As should be evident by now, while there is competition in the market for 
the production of property law, this market is quite different from the ordinary 
one for consumer goods. Property laws are, for the most part, produced by a 
political process. Consumers cannot simply contract with suppliers for the 
production and delivery of their desired goods or make purchases from 
retailers on an open, competitive market. The purchase price of property law is 
indirect, and is incurred when one casts votes, contributes to political 
campaigns, or enters into a jurisdiction and exposes oneself to local taxes. The 
supply side of the property law market is even more complicated. A variety of 
political institutions, most importantly elected legislative bodies, produce 
property laws.142 These bodies, in turn, are staffed by decisionmakers who 
ideally have no direct pecuniary interest in the legislative outcome, but who 
often seek to maximize ideological preferences, personal reputation, reelection 
opportunities, and other political rents, sometimes at the expense of state 
profits or the public welfare. The agency problem that plagues corporate law 
thus expresses itself even more sharply in the political context. Finally, the 
good being consumed itself bears a peculiar quality—property laws are 
jurisdictional, rather than personal. Generally, one cannot purchase a property 
law of individual application. 
                                                                                                                      
142.  Property law may also be produced by the courts. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying 
text (describing the role of courts and legislatures in legal developments in the law of 
cotenancies). 
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In a recent article, Saul Levmore observed that property institutions 
develop along two paths.143 The first path is presumed to be efficient, and is 
governed by the forces of supply and demand, mediated by transaction-cost 
economics.144 Along this path, new property rights evolve when the expected 
value from their creation exceeds the expected cost.145 The second path is not 
presumed to be efficient, and is dominated by interest groups engaged in 
constant rent-seeking. These actors do not seek to create efficient economic 
institutions, but rather to take advantage of their political influence to obtain 
favorable property regimes.146 The evolution of property law is thus shaped by 
two inconsistent forces and, in particular, the interplay between them. 
How does federalism affect the analysis? We contend that federalism 
augments the efficient forces and weakens the inefficient ones. As we already 
explained, the federal structure of the United States enables interstate 
competition over property forms along the lines of the Tiebout model. This 
competition places constant pressure on local legislatures to design or adopt 
new property regimes that are consistent with the preferences of local 
residents. To be sure, local legislatures are not immune from external interest-
group pressure. Nonlocal interest groups can influence local decisionmaking 
through campaign contributions and other forms of lobbying. However, as 
Madison noted, to the extent that these interest groups desire to establish 
uniform national rules, federalism stands as an obstacle.147 When lawmaking is 
done on the state level, as is the case with property, attempts by interest groups 
to achieve nationwide uniformity are by and large doomed.148 Imagine, for 
                                                                                                                      
143.  Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 181 (2003) 
[hereinafter Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path]; see also Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the 
Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (2002). 
144.  Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path, supra note 143, at 182 (“[T]he conventional and optimistic 
story is that the emergence of property rights in personal and real property has been a story 
of evolutionary success.”). 
145.  See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967). 
146.  Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path, supra note 143, at 182 (“There is room, however, for an 
alternative and more skeptical depiction of the evolution of these property rights. This story 
is one of interest groups, tribute, and grave market imperfections.”). 
147.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59, 62 (James Madison) (Carl Van Doren ed., 1979) (arguing 
that the federal system renders factions “unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of 
oppression” because the “influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their 
particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other 
States”). 
148.  This may create a problem if property regimes are characterized by network effects. A 
network externality exists when the utility that a given user derives from a good depends 
upon the number of other users who are in the same network. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & 
Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 
424 (1985). 
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example, that an interest group seeks to reintroduce the fee tail into all U.S. 
jurisdictions. If property law were produced by a central legislature, a massive 
lobbying campaign could yield the desired result. When the production of 
property law is controlled by the states, however, the lobbyists must target 
each state legislature, and more critically, every state has veto power over the 
proposed changes. Thus, federalism dilutes the influence of out-of-state 
interest groups and diminishes their ability to pass inefficient legislation for the 
whole country. 
Naturally, interest groups will often agree to settle for less than sweeping 
national changes. Changing the law in certain states may satisfy their goals. 
Yet, even in these cases, enhancing federalism provides a check on the ability of 
interest groups to pass inefficient legislation. The existence of more efficient 
property regimes in other states, and the ability of consumers to readily take 
advantage of such regimes, would create a constant pressure on states with less 
efficient ones to modify their laws. In the face of these competitive pressures, 
interest groups would have to expend more resources to maintain the 
inefficient regimes they helped pass. The higher cost of maintaining inefficient 
regimes may, in turn, deter interest group lobbyists from promoting the 
inefficient legislation in the first place. 
In the property context, as in others, interest groups opposing some kinds 
of revolutionary change will find themselves strengthened, rather than 
weakened, by federalism. For example, if property forms can be freely taken 
advantage of in every jurisdiction, interest groups will be able to defeat 
complete abolition of a property form by winning in a single jurisdiction.149 As 
we will discuss later, this necessitates limiting our proposal in order to prevent 
federalism from leading to a race to the bottom in property law.150 
D. Exit, Voice, and Federalism 
A related way of examining the issue of local provision of law and its 
interplay with politics is through the prism of Albert Hirschman’s distinction 
between the control mechanisms of “exit” and “voice.”151 Hirschman suggested 
that the market could exercise quality control over some types of goods, not 
only through consumers’ exercise of the option to exit and purchase a 
competing good, but also by utilizing consumers’ voice to appeal for superior 
products. Hirschman’s perspective may be translated into terms we have 
                                                                                                                      
149.  Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993) (arguing against viewing 
protection of the status quo as “neutral” among participants in the political arena). 
150.  See infra Section III.B. 
151.  ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
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discussed thus far. Control by exit parallels Tiebout’s competitive mechanism 
in which consumers obtain the preferred package of public goods by “voting 
with their feet.” Control by voice, in turn, corresponds to political control of 
public goods through effective democratic mechanisms. Naturally, proponents 
of an interest group theory of politics tend to be skeptical about the 
effectiveness of control through voice. 
Federal systems are designed to enhance both exit and voice options. The 
greater diversity of local property schemes allows owners to exit jurisdictions 
with undesirable property schemes in favor of states with more favorable ones. 
The effective limitation of interest groups to those jurisdictions in which they 
are strongest also decreases their ability to compete with rank-and-file property 
owners in other jurisdictions. In the context of contractual choice-of-law 
clauses, Larry Ribstein has argued that the ability to exit the jurisdiction of 
local law through choice-of-law clauses drives lawmakers to produce efficient 
laws.152 
William Fischel has also argued that local political control enhances 
property owners’ voice at the expense of other interest groups. According to 
Fischel’s “homevoter hypothesis,” homeowners dominate local politics 
because, as a group, homeowners’ most valuable asset is generally their homes, 
and that asset’s value is dramatically affected by local political decisions. Fischel 
notes that the local decisions that homeowners seek to affect are much broader 
than traditional property law, and include such related issues as property taxes, 
zoning, and educational funding. Nevertheless, the concentration of political 
power in the hands of homeowners seeking to maximize the value of their 
primary assets leads to an enhanced political voice for rank-and-file property 
owners at lower levels of government.153 
iii. enhancing choice in property 
In this Part, we move from the descriptive to the normative. Having 
explained how federalism shapes the American property system, and the 
attendant virtues of federalism, we now argue for a further expansion of state 
competition and individual choice in property law. Specifically, we propose a 
system that would allow owners to opt into certain out-of-state property 
regimes in exchange for the payment of a modest fee. Today, in order to enjoy 
an out-of-state property form, property owners typically must change their 
residence. Our proposal obviates the need to relocate, under certain 
                                                                                                                      
152.  See Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 
37 GA. L. REV. 363 (2003). 
153.  FISCHEL, supra note 30, at 6. 
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circumstances, by allowing property owners to avail themselves of the national 
menu of property forms. 
In our proposed world, a couple married in Massachusetts could agree to 
hold property under California’s community-property regime. As under 
current law, property forms could not thereafter be altered at will, but the 
creators of any given property estate would be able to choose among legal 
options from outside state lines in setting up the new estate. Thus, an 
individual creating a new property right in any part of the United States would 
be able to choose from the full list of forms available in all states. 
In the next Section, we lay out our proposal in greater detail. In the Section 
following, we address potential objections and explore some of the 
informational and prudential boundaries of our proposed scheme. 
A. A Proposal for Choice in Property 
Policymakers have failed so far to take full advantage of the expanded menu 
of property forms generated by the American federal system. At present, 
residents of a certain state who wish to adopt a property form of another state 
must relocate, as predicted by the Tiebout hypothesis, to the state in which 
their desired form is offered. There is no inherent reason, however, why this 
should be so. In sum, relocation costs are a distortion of the market for 
property forms that may lead property owners to choose suboptimally where 
such costs overwhelm the potential benefits of choosing a foreign state’s form. 
A helpful way to analyze the problem is by viewing property forms as an 
item on the market. In this view, when one chooses which property form to 
attach to a given asset, one chooses from the available options on the market 
just as one might select a television from an electronics store. To make this 
choice, the consumer evaluates the expected utility of the purchased asset and 
compares it to the market price. The state’s list of property forms, under the 
current property regime, is analogous to the list of domestically produced 
televisions, and out-of-state property forms are like imported televisions. The 
current requirement that one relocate in order to “purchase” out-of-state 
property forms acts like a tariff or an import tax. It discourages consumers 
from purchasing potentially superior out-of-state forms, thereby favoring sub-
optimal local forms.154 
                                                                                                                      
154.  Granted, the importation analogy is not precise in all respects. Today, one cannot order up 
an out-of-state property form at will and import it. Sometimes, as with community 
property, the property owner must migrate temporarily to the other state in order to 
impress a new property regime upon her ownership of an asset. Other times, the migration 
must be permanent in order to benefit from domiciliary situs rules governing property 
forms. Still, viewing relocation as a tax on out-of-state forms remains a useful way of 
examining the issue. 
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The higher cost of attaching out-of-state property forms to assets forces 
many owners to forego certain out-of-state forms they would have chosen in a 
perfectly competitive property-forms market, making them settle for an 
inferior in-state form. Thus, extending our analogy, our proposal acts as a free 
trade regime under which tariffs are eradicated and consumers can choose from 
among foreign and domestic products. Specifically, we seek to eliminate the 
need for relocation—whether temporary or permanent—in order to adopt out-
of-state property forms. Or, put differently, we call for the establishment of a 
national menu of property forms available to all citizens. 
Under our proposed regime, whenever a new property right is created or 
acquired, the parties may define the property right by choosing from the full 
menu of options available throughout the country. Thus, for example, when a 
landowner in Massachusetts transfers realty to her children in anticipation of 
her death, she may select not only from the available real property estate forms 
in Massachusetts, but also from those of New York, California, and all the 
other states of the Union. Naturally, in order to provide notice to interested 
third parties, the landowner would have to make an explicit indication in the 
in-state registry of the type of estate chosen. 
Additionally, the estate would have to be registered in the state from which 
the property form was taken. States must have some sort of incentive to offer 
innovative products and services, and property law is no exception. States that 
create and offer desirable property forms must stand to gain from their 
innovations. Indeed, only if states can collect the full value derived from 
innovative property forms—a measure that reflects the value for both in-state 
and out-of-state residents—will they have an optimal incentive to develop new 
property forms. 
Generally, states’ rewards come in the form of tax revenue. When residents 
vote with their feet and move to an area with superior public services and 
goods, they expose themselves to the full panoply of local taxes. Tiebout’s 
model predicts that local governments will adjust their taxes and services in 
order to reach the lowest average cost of providing the desired package of 
public goods. The problem is that relocation costs often prevent individuals 
from voting with their feet. Many property owners who wish to adopt an out-
of-state property form ultimately refrain from doing so due to the high 
relocation costs, thereby diminishing the states’ incentive to come up with 
innovative property forms. Put differently, the high relocation costs inhibit 
competition both on the demand side and the supply side. Worse yet, 
relocation costs are a social deadweight loss; they impose a cost on the 
relocating owner without creating offsetting benefits for anyone else.155 
                                                                                                                      
155.  Tiebout also noted the adverse effects of relocation costs on the market for local public 
services. See Tiebout, supra note 129, at 421-22. 
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To overcome the problem of high relocation costs we turn once again to the 
field of corporate law. There, the problem was avoided by allowing firms to 
incorporate in a state of their choice in exchange for the payment of an 
incorporation fee and the firm’s continued exposure to the incorporating state’s 
taxes and legal system. This option already provides some choice to owners of 
personal property who wish to take advantage of foreign property law. As we 
note later, the property law of chattel is determined by the owner’s domicile. 
An owner of chattel therefore may impose a foreign property regime on her 
personalty by creating a foreign corporation or trust and transferring the 
property to that entity.156 
However, our proposal goes beyond the option of fictional domiciliary 
change by directly permitting property registration in other jurisdictions, as 
with corporations. In effect, incorporation is a form of registration that permits 
the state to enjoy enhanced revenues as a result of superior legal forms. The 
broader lesson to be drawn is that registration can serve as the opening for 
states to enhance local revenues, and thereby profit from the superiority of the 
legal forms they provide. Registration, in other words, can substitute for 
relocation. Thus, we propose that rather than relocating, a property owner 
should be able to register asset X in any state of her choice, and by so doing 
attach the menu of property forms available under the law of that state to asset 
X. In exchange, the property owner will have to pay a one-time registration fee 
and, possibly, perennial property taxes. To be sure, because the asset will still 
be physically located in its original jurisdiction, this jurisdiction should also be 
able to impose property taxes—after all, the local jurisdiction will still have to 
provide services connected with the property.157 
Our proposed registration system evokes yet another analogy: choice-of-
law and forum provisions in contracts. As we noted earlier, parties often use 
choice-of-law clauses in contracts to take advantage of out-of-state legal 
provisions. There are several important differences to note, however. First, 
contract law is not subject to the dynamic of Tiebout competition. States do 
not benefit from the fact that out-of-state parties select their law in choice-of-
law clauses. Consequently, states have no incentive to craft contract laws that 
                                                                                                                      
156.  Cf. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 9, at 1065-74 (discussing the use of such fictional 
property relocation in the context of trust law competition, and noting that jurisdictional 
competition can undermine states’ policies). 
157.  We do not confine ourselves to any particular mechanism of implementing the registration 
system. One possibility is national legislation, allowing the states to adopt a uniform 
reciprocal system. Another might be state entrepreneurship, in which one state offers a 
registry, and leaves it to property owners to litigate or battle for recognition in other states. 
Irrespective of how a registry system arose, the efficiency of property registration would 
doubtless become one of the goods involved in property-form competition. 
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meet the needs of out-of-state parties.158 Out-of-state parties simply free-ride 
on the state’s contract law. Our proposal, by contrast, is likely to improve the 
quality of the legislating state’s substantive law—a phenomenon that is 
unlikely to occur with respect to contract law. Second, contracts are binding 
only on the contracting parties; they do not affect third parties. Property and 
corporate law, by contrast, affect many third parties. As Merrill and Smith 
correctly observed, property rights are in rem rights availing against the rest of 
the world, and they therefore impose informational and other costs on the 
public. As a result it is more important to govern the potential negative 
externalities imposed by property forms by extracting a price from the 
beneficiary of a property form.159 
B. The Limits of Choice in Property 
Having sketched out the basics of our proposal for expanding the choice of 
forms available to property owners, we now turn to potential objections to our 
scheme. We deal in turn with four potential challenges: the greater 
informational burdens imposed by relaxation of the numerus clausus principle; 
the use of out-of-state property forms to limit others’ rights, such as by 
reducing the exposure of property to adverse possession; the linkage between 
legal status, such as marital status, and the right to exploit property forms; and 
the potential tension between moral sensibilities and property forms. Each of 
these challenges demands that we more precisely tailor our federal property 
regime. 
1. Information Costs 
As we have noted, Merrill and Smith found the importance of the principle 
of numerus clausus in the imperative to convey information about property 
rights. According to Merrill and Smith, because property law creates rights in 
rem that are good against an indefinitely large group of people who will never 
bargain over the content of the rights, it is particularly important for the law to 
limit the opportunities for confusion about the rights’ content. Limiting the list 
                                                                                                                      
158.  Indeed, the related forum-selection clauses impose an uncompensated cost on the forum 
state. As Alex Stein recently noted, contracts create an externality in that they may give rise 
to future litigation, and the court system is subsidized by the public. See Alex Stein, An Essay 
on Uncertainty and Fact-Finding in Civil Litigation, with Special Reference to Contract Cases, 48 
U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 341-44 (1998). 
159.  This last point also explains, once again, why choice-of-law clauses in contract law are an 
imperfect substitute for free choice of property forms. The contract-only clauses bind the 
parties to the contract, but no others. Thus, even though contract law already recognizes the 
validity of choice-of-law clauses, there should still be a market for selecting property forms. 
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of property forms, wrote Merrill and Smith, accomplishes this goal by making 
third parties responsible only for determining which of the permitted property 
forms applies to a given object, rather than guessing which of an infinite 
number of bargains was struck, as is the case in the law of contract.160 
We believe that the informative importance of the numerus clausus rule can 
be overstated. First, even under the current system third parties cannot assume, 
without checking, that out-of-state forms do not apply to an asset. Property 
owners can and do move about the United States. Additionally, property 
transactions may be carried out by parties across state lines. As a consequence, 
states already must take account of foreign property rules in choice-of-law 
doctrines. For instance, one who purchases chattel from a person who recently 
moved into the area must take into account the possibility that the chattel is 
held in a property form unfamiliar in the jurisdiction where the sale is taking 
place. 
It is a longstanding choice-of-law rule that conflicts involving real estate are 
governed by the law of the situs in which the realty is located.161 Originating in 
England,162 this rule has been adopted by U.S. courts, and has been 
consistently applied in real estate cases. The courts’ continued adherence to the 
lex situs rule has attracted the ire of academic commentators.163 Critics of the 
rule argued that lex situs leads to the same inequitable results that prompted the 
abolition of other territorial rules from modern conflicts law and their 
replacement with a due process “minimum contacts” standard.164 Yet, the lex 
situs rule has withstood the attacks and continues to control disputes over real 
estate. 
By contrast, disputes involving personal property are controlled by the law 
of the owner’s domicile.165 This rule implies that owners can move personalty 
from one state to another and retain the property regime of their domicile. 
Therefore, insofar as personalty is concerned, third parties cannot assume that 
                                                                                                                      
160.  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 8 (“When property rights are created, third parties 
must expend time and resources to determine the attributes of these rights, both to avoid 
violating them and to acquire them from present holders.”). 
161.  See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 19.1, at 743 (2d ed. 1992). 
162.  Moffatt Hancock, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Laws and Judgments in Real Property 
Litigation: The Supreme Court and the Land Taboo, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1302-05 (1966) 
(describing the evolution of the lex situs rule in England). 
163.  See, e.g., MOFFATT HANCOCK, STUDIES IN MODERN CHOICE-OF-LAW: TORTS, INSURANCE, 
LAND TITLES 300-09 (1984) (criticizing the mechanical application of lex situs); Alden, supra 
note 27, at 586-87 (referring to decisions under the lex situs rule as “unjust” and calling for 
the abolition of the rule). 
164.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
165.  See HANCOCK, supra note 163, at 232. 
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the law of the situs applies. Rather, they must determine the owner’s domicile 
and ascertain the law of that jurisdiction. 
A further complication arises in cases involving marital property. As a 
general rule, when a married couple changes its domicile from a community-
property state to a common law state, the community property, and the 
property acquired with community funds, will remain as such.166 For example, 
if a couple from Washington (a community-property state) migrates to 
Pennsylvania (a common law state), the assets of the couple may be subject to a 
community-property regime even in Pennsylvania. Indeed, the relocation of 
couples from community-property to non-community-property states may 
result in new forms of hybrid property where a single item is partially ruled by 
a community-property regime, and partially not.167 Hence, in cases involving 
marital property, third parties must not only inquire about the domicile of the 
couple, but also about their domicile at the time an asset was acquired.168 
The legal intricacy of interstate marital property claims and transactions is 
likely to multiply in coming years as a result of the controversy over 
recognition of same-sex marriages. As noted earlier, Vermont and 
Massachusetts each recognize some form of same-sex union, but a substantial 
majority of states purport to deny full faith and credit to such unions.169 Given 
the political potency of the issue, and the intricacy of the attendant 
constitutional questions, the status of same-sex unions seems unlikely to be 
resolved in the near future. One imagines that it will not be long before 
complicated property cases—perhaps adopting old anti-miscegenation rules—
                                                                                                                      
166.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 259 (1971). Comment (a) to § 259 
notes: “Considerations of fairness and convenience require that the spouses’ marital 
property interests . . . are not affected by a change of domicil to another state by one or both 
of the spouses.” Comment (b) adds: “When a chattel or document is taken into a second 
state and is there exchanged for some other movable or immovable, the spouses acquire the 
same interests therein as they had in the original chattel or document.” 
167.  See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 558 So. 2d 821 (Miss. 1990) (holding that California pension 
rights are apportioned and governed by the California community-property regime for the 
time period of the couple’s domicile in California); see also REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 3, at 
599-601. 
168.  Further complications may be introduced by the local law on distribution of property upon 
dissolution of the marriage. As we have noted elsewhere, issues of distribution of “marital 
property” are not necessarily questions of property law. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 42, 
at 611-12. However, anticipated rules of distribution certainly confound the community-
property equation. See generally Merrie Chappell, Comment, A Uniform Resolution to the 
Problem a Migrating Spouse Encounters at Divorce and Death, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 993 (1992). 
169.  See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
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arise in which courts will have to fashion new conflict-of-laws rules to deal 
with incompatible laws of marital status.170 
Second, many forms of property rights may be registered—indeed, many 
property rights are protected only if the owner registers the rights.171 Once a 
right is registered, there is no need for guesswork at all about the nature of 
property protection that attaches to a given object, and the numerus clausus rule 
is thus of limited utility.172 
Third, the closed menu conveys very little information. For instance, a 
buyer of realty cannot know, on the basis of the numerus clausus rule, whether a 
seller of a given house is in possession of a life estate, a defeasible fee, or a fee 
simple absolute. Indeed, the buyer cannot even know whether the seller 
possesses any legal rights at all. The numerus clausus rule merely ensures that if 
the seller has legal rights, they will be in one of the recognized forms of estate. 
The numerus clausus rule thus transfers very little operative information. 
Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that there is an informational cost to 
permitting greater use of out-of-state property forms. We therefore suggest 
that states require registration of out-of-state property forms as a prerequisite 
for taking advantage of such forms. While there will be some costs involved in 
learning foreign law, the registry should offer greater clarity, significantly 
reducing the information costs of permitting increased choice. Additionally, as 
scholars have noted in the context of conflict of laws, parties that have to bear 
litigation costs will choose their law in a manner that reduces the costs of 
understanding and implementing foreign law.173 
2. Defensive and Offensive Uses of Property Choice 
To ensure that competition among states over property forms does indeed 
lead to a race to the top, it is necessary to distinguish between defensive and 
offensive uses. Specifically, we posit that the freedom of property owners to 
                                                                                                                      
170.  See Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We 
Still Married when We Return Home?, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1033; Alan Reed, Essential Validity of 
Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to Anglo-American Choice of Law 
Rules, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 387, 414-44 (2000); see also infra note 191. 
171.  Patents are an obvious example. Inventors must file their patent application for review by 
the Patent and Trademark Office and, if the patent is approved, it gets registered. As for 
copyrights, although registration is no longer a prerequisite for protection, it is a 
precondition for bringing an infringement suit. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2000). 
172.  But see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10 (arguing that the restriction on the creation of 
new property rights by private actors serves not to standardize rights, but rather to facilitate 
verification of the ownership of rights offered for conveyance). 
173.  See, e.g., Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1151 (2000). 
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import out-of-state forms should be restricted to defensive uses, and that the 
importation of offensive forms should not be permitted. 
The line between defensive and offensive uses is not easily drawn. 
Offensive uses are those that involve nonconsensual erosion of the property 
rights of other owners. Offensive uses thus include doctrines such as nuisance 
and adverse possession. Assume that A, a property owner from New York who 
plans to acquire title to B’s property by adversely possessing it, wishes to take 
advantage of the shorter adverse possession period that exists in California. 
Could she import the California rules of adverse possession and attach them to 
B’s property? The answer is no. Adverse possession is an offensive use, or 
form, and thus out-of-state owners may not import it. Similarly, property 
owners should not be able to take advantage of other states’ lax nuisance rules 
in order to diminish the value of neighboring properties. 
Defensive uses are different, in that they do not involve a nonconsensual 
erosion of other property owners’ rights. Consider, for example, the case of 
conservation easements. Assume that E, an avid environmentalist, wishes to 
create a conservation easement in a state that does not recognize this property 
form. Can E import the form? The answer, under our proposed regime, is yes. 
By creating a conservation easement, E does not adversely affect the rights of 
third parties. Of course, the creation of the easement has implications for E. 
Her decision to restrict future development may lower the price she will receive 
if she sells the property. The conservation easement may also improve the value 
of neighbors’ properties, or grant third parties new rights to enforce the 
easement. But the new easement cannot in any way diminish the rights of 
other property owners. 
What about more standard two-party easements? They too should fall 
under the category of defensive uses. If C and D voluntarily enter into an 
affirmative easement appurtenant that is not recognized by their own state but 
exists in other states, nothing should bar them from doing so.174 In this case, 
because the easement was created consensually, there is no fear that it will 
imperil the rights of the servient estate owner. By contrast to the nuisance 
example, the voluntary nature of the easement ensures against usurpation of 
third parties’ property rights. Of course, once the easement has been 
consummated, it will affect subsequent buyers and sellers of the lots. However, 
so long as these buyers and sellers are in full possession of the relevant 
information about the easement, the efficacy of the bargain will guide their 
actions. Because easements require registration to be binding on third parties, 
such parties should be able to learn of the easements at a very low cost. 
                                                                                                                      
174.  As we noted above in Section I.B, states differ on the kinds of duties and benefits that may 
be solemnized in an easement. 
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By the same token, even under our system, the rules of acquiring property 
that do not involve mutual consent should be those of the local state. Thus, one 
cannot use another state’s law to exercise finder’s rights or to prevent others 
from using the local law of adverse possession. In other words, nonconsensual 
acquisition of property should be strictly governed by local state law. To allow 
claimants under foreign acquisition rules—as distinct from locally recognized 
owners—to select such out-of-state rules unilaterally would increase conflicts 
over property and foment litigation. Indeed, attempts to import foreign 
acquisition rules should be viewed as offensive tactics of the sort our 
framework rejects. Only after property has been acquired can its owner decide 
which form to attach to it. The initial recognition of property rights in 
nonconsensual transactions should be left to local law. 
We illustrate some examples of defensive and offensive uses of property 
rules in the table below: 
Table 1. 
offensive and defensive property rules 
sample offensive uses sample defensive uses 
Adverse possession Tenancies (with consent of cotenants) 
Nuisance Trusts (with consent of beneficiaries and trustee) 
Easements (without consent of 
burdened party) 
Easements (with consent of benefited and 
burdened party) 
Finder’s Rights (without consent of 
original owner) 
Leaseholds (with consent of lessor and 
lessee) 
3. Status 
Closely related to the issue of federalism in property forms is the subject of 
status. Status issues related to property may arise in two ways. First, state law 
may determine the status of interpersonal relationships in a way that 
determines whether persons (real or artificial) or partnerships may hold 
property. For instance, some forms of property—such as tenancies by the 
entirety and community property—are available only to married couples. Yet 
state law is not uniform on the question of which couples are entitled to be 
married. Massachusetts, for instance, recently recognized the rights of same-
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sex couples to marry.175 Most states, however, do not recognize the married 
status of such couples. By the same token, all states recognize the rights of 
corporations, as artificial persons, to own property, but states differ on the 
qualifications for incorporation.176 
Second, state law governs the question of whether many objects such as 
fetal tissue177 or human organs178 may be the subject of claims under property 
law.179 
For the most part, the U.S. Constitution already dictates that the principle 
of choice should govern. Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, states must 
give full faith and credit to all public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of 
other states.180 As a consequence, states generally are unable to question a 
status granted in another state, and they may not refuse to respect property 
rights stemming from that status.181 This result is in accord with the needs of 
the federal system backed by our proposal. It should be noted, however, that 
the Clause also empowers Congress to determine the effect of public acts and 
records in other states. The extent of this power is not certain but, at least in 
                                                                                                                      
175.  See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (“Limiting the 
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples violates the 
basic premises of individual liberty and equality under law protected by the Massachusetts 
Constitution.”). Massachusetts was not the first state to recognize same-sex marriage. That 
distinction is reserved for Hawaii. In Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), a plurality of 
the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples 
violated the Hawaii Constitution’s equal protection clause and thus should be subject to 
strict scrutiny. The court remanded the case to allow the state to show that the prohibition 
was narrowly tailored and promoted a compelling state interest. On remand, the circuit 
court held that the state had failed to meet its burden, effectively legalizing same-sex 
marriage. Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). 
Hawaii subsequently amended its constitution to ban same-sex marriage. HAW. CONST. art. 
1, § 5 (amended 1996). 
176.  See, e.g., Cyril Moscow, Michigan or Delaware Incorporation, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1897 (1996). 
177.  See Nancy E. Field, Note, Evolving Conceptualizations of Property: A Proposal To De-
Commercialize the Value of Fetal Tissue, 99 YALE L.J. 169 (1989). 
178.  See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1988) (denying 
a property right under California law in spleen cells removed from a patient’s body). See 
generally Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 195 (1996). 
179.  Federal law governs the susceptibility of some items to property rights. The prominent 
example is the property status of inventions, expressions, and marks. See supra note 1. 
180.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by 
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be 
proved, and the Effect thereof.”). 
181.  But see Habib A. Balian, Note, ‘Til Death Do Us Part: Granting Full Faith and Credit to Marital 
Status, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 398-99 (1995) (noting limits on comity with regard to 
marriages in violation of a state’s public policy). 
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the above-mentioned case of DOMA,182 Congress has claimed the right to 
abolish altogether the requirement that states recognize the validity of acts 
respecting a same-sex relationship “that is treated as a marriage” or rights and 
claims “arising from such [a] relationship.”183 As previously noted, scholars 
dispute the Act’s validity,184 and this conflict is almost certain to be resolved 
ultimately by the Supreme Court. 
Quite aside from DOMA and related acts, a handful of states have retained 
some version of the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, which forbids 
nonresidents from utilizing temporary entry into a state to take advantage of 
different state rules regarding marriage.185 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce 
Act abolished the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act,186 and most states followed 
suit. Among the states retaining a version of the Evasion Act are Illinois,187 
Massachusetts,188 and Mississippi.189 
The Evasion Laws are a statutory embodiment of the “public policy” 
exception to the requirement of full faith and credit. The exception—a 
principle that emerged from conflict-of-laws doctrine—permits states to refuse 
to recognize the validity of foreign states’ acts where such recognition would 
“involve an improper interference with important interests of the sister 
State.”190 The public policy exception thus allows states to reject foreign acts 
that are considered incompatible with domestic law for reasons of public 
                                                                                                                      
182.  See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text. 
183.  28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). 
184.  See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
185.  Enacted in 1912, the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act sought to “codify the rule nullifying 
out-of-state marriages by domiciliaries whose marriage would be prohibited within the 
domicile.” See Koppelman, supra note 78, at 944. While the statute failed to achieve broad 
adoption, and was withdrawn in 1943, about fourteen states still have some form of the 
statute. Id. at 944 & n.73. 
186.  UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 201 cmt., 9A U.L.A. 175 (1998). 
187.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/216 (1993 & Supp. 2005). 
188.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 11 (West 1998); see also supra note 16. 
189.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-3 (2004). 
190.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 (1971); see also supra note 80. 
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policy.191 While it is well-grounded in case law, important questions have been 
raised about the public policy exception’s constitutionality.192 
The logic of our position dictates that an out-of-state status that affects 
property rights should be available on the same terms as out-of-state property 
rights themselves. In other words, access to out-of-state statuses should not be 
limited, subject to the exceptions outlined in this Section.193 
4. Morality and Property 
Property has an obvious moral dimension. The infamous example of 
human slavery in the United States amply demonstrates that there may be 
moral reasons for abolishing some previously recognized forms of property. 
In theory, our proposal could make it possible for one state to impose 
immoral property forms on other states. This concern finds support in the 
infamous case of Dred Scott.194 There, the Supreme Court ruled that 
congressional acts making certain federal territories slave-free were 
unconstitutional because they deprived slave masters of their “property” in 
contravention of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.195 In formulating 
a proposal that would allow the property regime of a single state to extend 
beyond its borders, the lessons of the past should not be forgotten. 
A simple and ready way to assuage this fear is to let the federal government 
retain its residual power to intervene in “the market for property forms” 
through regulation. When the federal government elects to intervene for moral 
reasons it can either do so by excluding certain assets from appropriation or by 
prohibiting certain property forms in specific assets. Intervention of the former 
type may be employed if a state attempts to create property rights in other 
human beings. Regulation to outlaw such attempts is consistent with the 
                                                                                                                      
191.  For discussions of the public policy exception in the context of same-sex marriage, see F.H. 
Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 561; 
Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and the Public Policy Exception in Choice-of-Law: Does It 
Really Exist?, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 61 (1996); L. Lynn Hogue, State Common-Law Choice-
of-Law Doctrine and Same-Sex “Marriage”: How Will States Enforce the Public Policy 
Exception?, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 43-44 (1998); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage 
and Public Policy: The Miscegenation Precedents, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 105 (1996); 
Koppelman, supra note 78; and Sack, supra note 80. 
192.  See Kramer, supra note 80. 
193.  A similar conclusion was reached by Larry Ribstein. See Larry E. Ribstein, A Standard Form 
Approach to Same-Sex Marriage, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 309 (2005). 
194.  Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
195.  Id. at 450-51. 
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Thirteenth Amendment and is fully justified in our opinion.196 Intervention of 
the latter type may be appropriate to regulate property regimes in human 
organs or tissues. For example, the federal government may decide for moral 
reasons that a person may donate her organs but not sell them.197 Alternatively, 
one might rely upon the public policy doctrine from the field of conflict of laws 
to reject perceived immoral forms at the state level. Under this doctrine, states 
would reject a property form (or status) that was so contrary to the moral 
standards of the state as to be an intolerable interference with the state’s 
sovereignty.198 
Fortunately, it is highly unlikely that any state in the Union would try to 
reintroduce slavery. However, there may still be instances where moral 
arguments should trump property rights, such that it would be wrong to force 
interstate recognition of immoral property forms. Indeed, claims have been 
made regarding the moral propriety of recognizing property rights in 
animals,199 fetal tissue or organs,200 and rights stemming from marital 
status.201 
                                                                                                                      
196.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”). 
197.  See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) 
(arguing that markets have inherent limitations and that certain entitlements must, for 
moral reasons, remain outside the ken of market transactions). 
198.  See supra Subsection III.B.3. 
199.  See, e.g., STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS 
(2000) (contending that certain species of primates should be considered persons and given 
basic human rights). 
200.  See, e.g., Gregory Gelfand & Toby R. Levin, Fetal Tissue Research: Legal Regulation of Human 
Fetal Tissue Transplantation, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 647 (1993) (arguing in favor of the 
moral propriety of using fetal tissue). 
201.  See, e.g., Mary Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 165, 
172 (1998) (“Laws establishing slavery and denying property rights to married women could 
not be justified by traditional moral norms under this standard, because these laws 
facilitated the ability of whites and men to dominate slaves and women in personal 
relationships and to exploit their labor and sexuality.”); see also Michael Paulson, Vatican 
Warns on Same-Sex Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 2003, at A1 (reporting on a Vatican 
declaration that same-sex marriages “go against natural moral law”). Congressman Henry 
Hyde, while arguing in favor of DOMA, stated that whether society should recognize same-
sex marriage “is a moral issue” and that “[p]eople don’t think that the traditional marriage 
ought to be demeaned or trivialized by same-sex unions.” SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND 
CON 225 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997). 
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conclusion 
The federal character of American property law renders it a fertile ground 
for experimentation with new and exciting property regimes. The positive 
project of this Essay is to show how state production of property law enhances 
diversity in property forms and thereby enables more individuals to satisfy 
their property preferences. The normative project of this Essay is to suggest a 
mechanism that would further expand the menu of available property forms. 
Recognizing that relocation costs can hobble the beneficial effects of state 
competition over property forms, the Essay proposes that property owners be 
permitted to adopt out-of-state property forms in exchange for the payment of 
a registration fee. Our proposal creates not only more choices for property 
owners, but also a meaningful incentive for states to invest in more innovative 
property regimes. In the absence of a dominant state, like Delaware in the 
corporate context, competition in the field of property along the lines of our 
proposal has the potential to revitalize this venerable, yet antiquated, field. 
 
